

Political Glossary of January 08, 2023, in Brazil: #Disinformation; #Denialism and #Antidemocratization

#Disinformation; #Negationism and #Antidemocratization: Political glossary in Brazil of January 8, 2023

Glosario político en BRASIL del 08 de enero de 2023: #Desinformación; #Negacionismo y #Antidemocratización

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Abstract: Based on the outlook of communication and media studies, this article discusses the anti-democratic events that shook Brasilia on January 8, 2023. A selection of samples of media coverage of these events allows us to trace a cartographic route in our effort to identify expressive intensiveness and political and existential territories that shape this unfortunate episode in the history of Brazil. Among the conceptual operators that help us determine the criteria for analysis, we highlight language and discourse (Avelar, 2021; Nobre, 2022; Rocha, 2021), sociotechnical assemblages (Lemos, 2021, 2020; Cesarino, 2022), and the displacements of the moral grounding (Sibilia, 2022) in the techno-mediatised public sphere (Miskolci, 2021). Our discussion focuses on important axes to understand Brazil's neofascism surge and its performative-discursive strategies. The resulting political glossary warns us about topics that demand intense vigilance and scrutiny: disinformation, denialism, and anti-democratization.

Keywords:

Communication and politics; disinformation; anti-democratization; January 8th in Brazil

Resumo: Com base no olhar da comunicação social, apresentamos uma reflexão acerca dos atos golpistas na capital, Brasília, em 08 de janeiro de 2023. Por meio de um percurso cartográfico em uma seleção de veículos da mídia brasileira na cobertura das manifestações

antidemocráticas, buscamos identificar as intensidades expressivas e os territórios existenciais e políticos que conformaram esse episódio particular e infeliz da história do Brasil. Como operadores conceituais que nos auxiliam na determinação dos critérios de análise, elencamos os agenciamentos sociotécnicos (Lemos, 2021, 2020; Cesarino, 2022), a linguagem e o discurso (Avelar, 2021; Nobre, 2022; Rocha, 2021), e os deslocamentos do solo moral (Sibilia, 2022) na esfera pública tecno-midiatizada (Miskolci, 2021). Nossa reflexão destaca importantes vetores para compreendermos a ascensão do neofascismo no Brasil e suas estratégias performático-discursivas. O resultante glossário político nos alerta para temas que demandam intensa vigilância: a desinformação, o negacionismo e a antidemocratização.

Palavras-chaves:

Comunicação e política; desinformação; antidemocratização; 08 janeiro no Brasil

Resumen: A partir de la mirada de los medios, este artículo presenta una reflexión sobre la toma de nuestra capital, Brasilia, el 8 de enero de 2023. A través de un recorrido cartográfico en una selección de vehículos mediáticos de cobertura de manifestaciones antidemocráticas, se busca identificar las intensidades expresivas y los territorios existenciales y políticos que dieron forma a este particular y desafortunado episodio de la historia de Brasil. Como operadores conceptuales que nos ayuden a determinar los criterios de análisis, enumeramos los ensamblajes sociotécnicos (Lemos, 2021, 2020; Cesarino, 2022), lenguaje y discurso (Avelar, 2021; Nobre, 2022; Rocha, 2021), y los desplazamientos del terreno moral (Sibilia, 2022) en la esfera pública tecno-mediaticada (Miskolci, 2021). Nuestra reflexión destaca vectores importantes para comprender el surgimiento del neofascismo en Brasil y sus estrategias performativo-discursivas. El glosario político resultante nos alerta sobre temas que exigen una intensa vigilancia: desinformación, negacionismo y anti-democratización.

Palabras clave:

Comunicación y política; desinformación; anti-democratización; 8 de enero en Brasil

1. Introduction

An article (Maia, 2023) from the website *Politize* after the takeover coup¹ in Praça dos Três Poderes on January 8 compares the anti-democratic attack to the protests that took place in Brasilia in 2013 and 2017, narrating each episode in the country's capital due to the ultra-right bias. On June 17, 2013 (Artigo 19, 2013), a large group of protesters occupied the marquee of the National Congress, which houses the domes of the Senate and Chamber, icons of the modern architecture of Oscar Niemeyer. Almost 90% of the Brazilian population (Figure 1) supported the national proportion's popular uprising.



Figure 1. Demonstration of June 2013. Source: BBC News Brazil.²

In 2017, the Brazilian streets again agitated with reactions against the impeachment process of Dilma *Rousseff* and the labor and social security reforms proposed by the government of Michel Temer. Protesters invaded the Chamber of Deputies and destroyed windows, which the Legislative Police later contained (Figure 2).



Figure 2. April 2017 demonstration³. Source: Agência Brasil.

On January 8, 2023, a mob stormed the federal capital to violently contest the victory of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the 2022 elections and eventually provoke a military

¹Cf. Evangelista (2022), em <https://outraspalavras.net/outrasmidias/dos-escombros-do-neoliberalismo-nasce-a-ultradireita/>. Access on: 21.abr.2023

²<https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-63507138>. Access on: 21.abr.2023

³ <https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/geral/noticia/2017-05/com-depredacao-de-ministerios-e-confronto-ato-em-brasilia-reune-45-mil-pessoas>. Access on: 08.abr.2023.

intervention in the country to "restore public order." The result will go into the history books: coup takeover, terrorism, and destruction of public property in the headquarters of the Three Powers (Figure 3).



Figure 3. January 2023 coup. Source: BBC News Brazil.⁴

While that report focused on the similarities between the three events, the goals are the crucial difference for us. The 2013 and 2017 demonstrations stood in defense of specific public policies. In 2023, an angry horde was unleashed to contest the democratic election and press calling for the overthrow of a legitimately elected government. This demonstration is the initial stage of analysis of the phenomenon discussed in this paper: the insurgency of neofascism in Brazil and its performative-discursive strategies mobilized in an ecosystem of disinformation that feeds cognitive dissonance (Bruno, 2020), tumult the political game and undermines the democratic debate in the techno-meditized public sphere (Miskolci, 2021).

From a communication viewpoint, the gaze allows us to unveil the production of meanings in the ruses of cynical rationality (Sibilia, 2022) that spreads in several social layers. Thus, we are led to explore the presence of ultra-conservative guidelines around morality, religion, and family in the cynical discourse of social entrepreneurship "from below" (Nunes, 2022), the anti-corruption flag as a strategy of delegitimization of political opponents, the intensive circulation of Fake News and hate speech populist flirtation that aligns with the international ultra-right's takeover purposes.

⁴ <https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-64220631> Access on: 08.abr.2023.

2. Methodology

We were inspired by the cartographic method to analyze the media coverage of January 8⁵ through March 2⁶ 2023, when the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry installation in the Legislative Chamber in Brasilia⁷ took place. The articles for the analysis were selected through the Google search engine news portal ranking as transmitted by the YouTube channel. The relevance of audiovisuals⁸ in the Brazilian scenario justifies its importance in selecting 38 reports that allowed us to trace an initial path in this discussion. The theoretical framework considered essential aspects of current political communication: sociotechnical agencies (Lemos, 2021, 2020; Cesarino, 2022), language and speech (Avelar, 2021; Nobre, 2022; Rocha, 2021), the displacement of moral soils (Sibilia, 2022) and the techno-mediated public sphere (Miskolci, 2021), vectors for the rise of the new right in Brazil.

The paper is divided into three parts. First, we present an initial outline of the anti-democratic manifestations and performative-discursive strategies of the insurgency of the ultra-right in Brazil. In the second part, we observe the landscape from the sociotechnical agency and focus on the disinformation ecosystem that undermines the democratic debate and is responsible for the territorialization and deterritorialization movements that allow unveiling specific layers of moral sense "displaced" (Sibilia, 2022) in the techno-mediated public sphere (Miskolci, 2021).

In the third and last part, we draw the lines of escape based on analyzing the Bolsonaro phenomenon and the role of particular churches in the ultraconservative agendas of the coup mobilization. We highlight the pragmatism of attacks supported by businessmen, military, and politicians who financed, inflated, and facilitated the action of extremists, which began in the camps in front of the barracks in various places of the country soon after the election until emptying in the invasion of Brasilia on January 8.

⁵ Example of one of the selected subjects. *Portal UOL*. Live on January 8th. UOL. Live: terrorists attack Brasilia and invade Congress. 08/01/2023. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AcRYyhoFwfc>Accesson: Apr.

⁶ Example of one of the selected subjects, which questions the installation of the CPI. Folha de S.Paulo. Lula says he does not want CPI of January 8 and parliamentarians and citizens question: why is it? 19/01/2023. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xYg1-LXGxQU> Accessed on: 08.abr.2023.

⁷ In Brazil, the Parliamentary Committees of Inquiry (CPIs) are one of the forms of the Legislative Power to exercise its supervisory function. They are created to ascertain fact determined by request of at least one third of parliamentarians. See more at: <https://www.al.sp.gov.br/comissao/comissoes-parlamentares-de-inquerito/Acesso> at: 08.abr.2023.

⁸ According to a recent study conducted by Statista, the international statistical bank, Brazil occupies the 5th. Ranking position of the 20 nations that have more users on social networks. The forecast is 87% of Brazilians will be users of social networks in 2026. Available in: <https://www.nic.br/noticia/na-midia/87-brasileiros-serao-usuarios-de-redes-sociais-em-2026/Accesson>: 08.abr.2023.

The conclusion takes a communication viewpoint and presents a political glossary that points towards themes that demand intense vigilance and scrutiny: disinformation, denial, and anti-democratization.

3. Charting a map

Jair Bolsonaro was not re-elected in 2022, but the hate speech and escalating violence unleashed on his behalf resulted in the attack on Brasilia on January 8, 2023. João Cezar de Castro Rocha (2021) aims to "convince the reading public of the serious threat posed by Bolsonarism to democracy" (p. 6). For supporters, any political adversary is an enemy to be harassed and ultimately eliminated. The rhetoric of hatred prevents dialogue in the Brazilian social and political environment. An escalation of authoritarianism and violence erodes the democratic order. In his analysis, the scholar defended⁹ the need to understand the Bolsonarista movement through his speech, worldview, and language dispersed in digital networks. This interrelation forms a belief system that keeps nearly 30%¹⁰ of the Brazilian population who support it cohesive.

On January 8, the newspapers reported the invasion calling the acts either a "manifestation" (legitimate) or "terrorist" acts or pointing to those responsible as "Bolsonaro extremists." Three days later, on January 11, the News inflamed the statements of the Minister of the Supreme Court (STF), who ordered the removal of the governor of the Federal District by omission and possible collusion with the event, in addition to the flagrant arrest of members of the mob involved in the invasion of the Three Powers Square; while reporting the concern of a new "threat of demonstration."¹¹

During the week that followed the attack, the dispute for the hearing was about the statements of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva about the "opening of the Palace Door" facilitated by the military in favor of the Bolsonaro extremists; and also, the presentation of "new images and videos" that showed the violence perpetrated by the extremists. An important development of the case occurred with an articulation of the right-wing parliamentarians for establishing a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) to ascertain

⁹ To learn more, an interview given by Professor Rocha to journalist Pedro Doria, from *Jornal Meio* (online) is available on YouTube. Available in:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mKkbsFNUDX&list=PLoqCk3g6WofUA37_5-6sym2f2vSFoV4EC&index=125 Acesso on: Apr 2022.

¹⁰ BBC News Brazil. Who are the 30% who still support Bolsonaro. 11/07/2020. Disponível em: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WBqMfmGaVrg> . Accessed on 08.Apr.2022.

¹¹ The independent website *Meteoro Brasil* made a free entitled "Bolsonaristas mark new manifestation in Brasilia". Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7bUM-boRWqQA> Acesso on: 08.abr.2023.

responsibility for the "coup acts" that would have been triggered by the elected president himself. The odd thesis can be summarized in a live broadcast in which it is claimed that "confidential documents" supposedly¹² prove that President Lula and his Minister of Justice would have known "in advance" what would happen on January 8 in the capital.

It is interesting to highlight the inversion of the nexus of discourse. First, we have the evidence in images and videos that the military were accomplices and, subsequently, the attempt to demonstrate that the Federal Government would have been silent in repressing anti-democratic acts. In this turbulent political scenario, the government led the creation of the CPI.

When examining the conditions that provided the acts of January 2023, our focus is on the belief system (Rocha, 2021) that inflated a layer of the population to the clash with a supposed hegemony or left-wing indoctrination on a global scale. Although "populism" (Barros & Lago, 2022) is not central to this discussion, it should be thoroughly evaluated.

When dealing with the relationship between populism and media in Latin America, Waisbord (2013) points to contemporary "neopopulism" (p. 49), a political style of communication fixed in public life impregnated with the media. Notably, the organization and ideology of ultra-right political movements are not direct products of the position of their members in the relations of production. On the contrary, they are performatic-discursive constructions that can assume the most varied formats, including the ideal of "people" as the subject and object of their strategies.

Another important point about the discourse of the "Brazilian right" is the always resounding presence of a "conspiracy" that only the "legitimate" (representatives of the Brazilian people) would have access to. False symmetries, conspiratorial discourses, and the promotion of ultra-conservative moral values are widely spread by the ultraright, inside and outside Brazil.

The rediscovery techniques had significant relevance in the movements culminating in the January 8, 2023 attack. To understand this moving landscape of networks, we resort to rhetorical analysis of the political discourse made by Avelar (2021), for whom the language of bolsonarism is incomprehensible without attention to a particular modulation, own internet, shaped in recent years by the contents of the far right:

This language does not depend on lexical content and transits with content [...]. It is constituted from a constellation of rhetorical operations: repeated action in identical vehicles,

¹² Report by *Folha de S.Paulo*. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QovNvC3xih8>

extremely aggressive record against the interlocutor or subject thematized in the speech, complete disregard of the difference between factual truth, hypothesis, and pure invention, hyperbolic mode of speech, permanent Postulation of something hidden and adoption of an ambiguity about the seriousness or not of the utterance and belief or disbelief of the enunciating subject in it. (Avelar, 2021, p. 316)

The author calls this particular language of the internet "language of trolling." It serves the function of ensuring the automatic degeneration of content if questioned or denied in the face of uncertainty about the status of the statements. Also, it offers the humor necessary to keep the attention of "users" in the volatile world of online social networks. The "right-wing YouTubers" constitute a social stratum inflated by a peculiar combination of Christian fundamentalism and Olavo-bolsonarist principles as anti-communism and conspiratorial conception of global politics against a supposed left-wing cultural hegemony. A generalized resentment anchored in exclusions of different hues had created the vacuum in which the negationist discourse proliferated. The negationist behavior and its belief system are firmly anchored in a systematic and intentional process of disinformation.

A common¹³ strategy among disinformation producers in Brazil is to maintain one or more websites that mimic news portals in structure, language, and name, and at the same time, a series of pages in social networks that share what is produced by websites. The disinformation ecosystem consolidates when countless automated fake profiles (bots) entangled in social media platforms share these contents en masse.

Fake News is disseminated mainly through WhatsApp (Ortellado & Ribeiro, 2018). While in WhatsApp, credibility would be in personal testimony, for the pages and sites that produce misinformation, credibility would be in the assumption that there was a supposed journalistic investigation.

To move forward, we will analyze the movements of territorialization and deterritorialization in the landscape in which we are inserted.

4. Movements of territorialization and deterritorialization

When dealing with the dangers of an anti-democratic strategy in Brazil in times of pandemic in previous work (Castro & Oliveira, 2022), we argue that the Brazilian government promoted misinformation by questioning health authorities, denying science, and trying to divert attention with racist, sexist, xenophobic or homophobic appeals. This premise

¹³ <https://www.monitordigital.org/>. Accessed on: 08.abr.2023.

converges with other studies about the disinformation prevailing in Brazil during the Covid-19 pandemic and its harmful consequences (Recuero & Soares, 2021; Gehrke & Benetti, 2021; Cunha, 2021). In a severe health crisis interspersed with economic and political crises, the disinformation associated with the dismantling of institutions and the attack on freedom of expression had disastrous consequences. The anti-democratic acts of January 8 also attest to this concern.

The search for the types of disinformation propagated in Brazil during the pandemic led Gehrke and Benetti (2021) to the following typology: almost half of the untrue content distributed on Brazilian social networks in the period analyzed by researchers resorted to the creation of "false context," using a fact or an authentic image but taking them out of context to generate an untruth (p. 22). The second most recurrent type of misinformation was "fabricated content," entirely false, created to mislead. This strategy focuses on ignorance about the institutions' reality and functioning and the interlocutor's inability to recognize the signs of falsification. And the third type, with still relevant presence, is the "impostor content," which applies false content to the official logo of an organization (ministry, political party, technology company) or frauds the statement of the genuine source. In the political perspective that goes against our article, this typology corroborates with some¹⁴ reports made during the period under analysis that deals with how religion was instrumentalized in manipulating extremist groups in Brazil.

Among the heralds of Bolsonaro's conservatism are politicians with a mandate and characters little known to the general public but who easily traffic in a thriving "parallel world" on social networks. Attention is drawn to the number of preachers who congregate legions of followers preaching a "holy war" against political opponents. Some of these profiles work exclusively on social networking platforms and provide religious speeches to those who dream of Bolsonaro's return to power.

More than information, systematically nourished beliefs and convictions matter, especially the affections mobilized according to the political and economic interests of those who deliberately produce and circulate such lies and frauds on a massive scale. The neofascist content of this form of convocation to emotional and political adherence to neofascism is worked to produce engagement since "fascism is mobilizing and feeds on confrontation" (Soares, 2020, p. 70).

¹⁴ Example model is the documentary produced by BBC News Brazil on the subject and published on 03/04/2023. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QVLYafGRvA4A>Accessat: 08.abr.2023.

To clarify the territorial and deterritorialization movements that we propose to analyze, we consider the alignment of specific perspectives in the same landscape that configures the current Brazilian political territory: (i) a discursive perspective: in which is enclosed a vision of the war world that conforms a specific language, the "rhetoric of hatred," which conforms the narratives against the left and the permanent communist threat, aligned with conspiracy theories; (ii) a perspective of sociotechnical agencies: in which we find a sophisticated ecosystem of misinformation agency in the capillarity of online social networks. In parallel, the attack on institutions and the press increases the feeling of insecurity and vulnerability, which corroborates with beliefs that conform to all sorts of denials, including on the smoothness of the presidential elections in Brazil; and (iii) an anti-democratic perspective: despite the need to seek dialogues, mechanisms, and tools to create possibilities for coexistence in the public techno-mediatised sphere, what is perceived is a sharpening of the split.

Discourse, agency, and anti-democracy are part of the same constitutive landscape of the current Brazilian political territory. How to tread these paths that sometimes present themselves as complex and tortuous? Following, we indicate the lines of escape transverse to the map created here for a deeper reflection on the role of churches in mobilizing anti-democratic acts and ultra-conservative agendas that preach a return to traditional values and assume supposedly nationalistic and patriotic rhetoric.

5. Lines of Flight

Our reflection presupposes an accurate observation of the production-circulation-consumption of performative-discursive mobilization guided by real-time metrics. The comparison of the invasion in Brasilia with the assault on the Capitol in the USA is recurrent, not without reason. What communicative and cultural factors explain this advance of the right in the world? Rancière (2021) calls it a "perversion of reason." Negationism - which contrasts with the environment of rational and democratic thought we inhabit - raises questions about unleashing the purest irrationality at the heart of the electoral process and the representative system. This obstinate refusal to acknowledge the attested facts is widely shared and deliberately supported.

In defining negationism, Luiz Eduardo Soares (2020) understands that this "has been the method of the foundation of the real, which (...) ties the consensus reproducing structures of fanciful plausibility that confer verisimilitude to the implausible" (p. 75). According to Rocha (2021), the movement we commonly call Bolsonarism is a "powerful belief system,

endowed with paranoid internal coherence, making it practically immune to the principles of reality" (p. 359). It would be precisely cognitive dissonance the engine of the Bolsonaro digital masses.

Although the issue of Fake News is important and deserves to be considered a public problem, we are not facing ignorant or naive people. Following the line of argument of Rancière (2021), if these layers of the population reject what is obvious, it is to show that they are bright and intelligent. We face values, moral codes, and lifestyles that consolidate beliefs and build parallel and spurious realities.

The materiality of these beliefs can be attested to in the reports on creating the CPI to investigate the coup in Brasilia. The interpretation of the facts by the media becomes fertile ground for the negationist delusion and the most astonishing conspiracy theories. According to Rancière (2021), this type of rationality requires us to see each particular fact as a consequence of a supposed global order.¹⁵

Globalization, for many authors, would be the turning point for the crisis of liberal democracy (Castells, 2018). Our (in)ability, as a society, to deal with multiple crises - health, economic and political - points to the "rupture" between rulers and governed. Consequently, it deepens distrust in the institutions and delegitimizes political representation. Authors such as Waisbord (2022) highlight the pandemic as an essential trigger in the tension between scientific and political truth in contemporary public communication. Disinformation, questions, and conflicts about the credibility of experts and the amount of information circulating in media spaces are some of the vectors of what the author calls "communicative fractures." Public rationality, guided by democratic principles, demands conditions of communication such as credible information, epistemological agreements on data and facts, and, not least, citizen participation. Without this, Waisbord (2022) asserts there is no possible significant consensus on the definition of a problem, the diagnosis of the cause, and the debate of solutions.

Irrationality and superstition constitute another rationality that conforms to thoughts and interprets the world. In this context, the Bolsonaro phenomenon transcends the figure of Jair Bolsonaro and is characterized by an ultraconservative, authoritarian, and individualistic worldview. As we focus on the corpus *selected* here, we find evidence of fractures and fragmentations that determine the communicational chaos in which we find ourselves. At the

¹⁵ Report of *Folha de S.Paulocom* the headline "Lula says he does not want CPI of January 8 and parliamentarians and citizens question: why is it? 19/01/2023. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xYg1-LXGxQU>. Accessed on: 08.abr.2023.

same time that a pastor and political representative questions the good or bad faith of the mob that invaded Brasilia¹⁶, military police¹⁷¹⁸ fraternize and let themselves be photographed with the invaders dressed in green and yellowish. Although we must recognize that there are historical tensions between different and opposite logics of production of meaning in confrontation, we are faced with a "structure" (Lemos, 2021) that informs and forms a "disinformation ecosystem" (Recuero & Soares, 2021) deliberately designed for power-taking purposes.

We are aware that our intention to unveil layers of meaning of a recent episode of such magnitude is faced with developments that do not cease to occur. This emblematic episode resulted in the dismissal of the Army Commanding General, the Institutional Security Group (GSI) team, and its commander. A Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) in the Legislative Chamber investigates the coup acts at the district level. Parliamentarians discuss the structure of the Joint Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry (CPMI) established to investigate the attacks on democracy in the National Congress.

The release of a video of anti-democratic acts¹⁹ by security cameras triggered a duel of versions (Diniz, 2023). The predominant narrative in WhatsApp groups was guided by the ultra-right, which accused the current government of covering up the anti-democratic acts of January 8. Evidencing the cognitive dissonance in which they are immersed, pro-Bolsonaro deputies asked for the impeachment of Lula da Silva, evidencing a performatic-discursive act whose meaning could only emerge in a parallel regime of disinformation.

Meanwhile, investigations and punishments of the coup plotters advance in the Superior Electoral Court (STF): the 2,151 arrested red-handed at the time of the attack were denounced to justice for the crimes committed (Macario, 2023) legal process is still in progress with significant developments for democracy in Brazil.

6. Conclusion

At a time when, a few months ago, the country's capital suffered the attack of a mob unhappy with the result of the presidential election that had just taken place, it is imperative

¹⁶ Silas Malafaia Channel. Acts in Brasilia: undemocratic? Golpistas? 08/01/2023. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oKMaiSI-OD4>. Retrieved April 11, 2023.

¹⁷ Canal Poder 360. PM-DF takes photo with invaders from Praça dos Três Poderes. 08/01/2023. Disponível em: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RCKErQjbVHE>. Accessed on: 11.Apr.2023.

¹⁸ Canal Jovem Pan. Lula decrees federal intervention in the Federal District. 08/01/2023. Available in: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O88W2Opowwc>. Accessed on 11.Apr.2023.

¹⁹ Sheet of S.Paulo. Lula's GSI minister resigns after wearing out with 8/1 images. 19.04.2023. Available in: https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2023/04/ministro-do-gsi-de-lula-pede-demissao-apos-desgaste-com-imagens-do-81.shtml?utm_sourcenews=letter&utmmedium=email&utmcam. Accessed on: 24.Apr.2023.

to promote a serious academic discussion about the place of communication articulated to citizenship and democracy. In the era of post-truth cynicism, the deliberate mass production and distribution of Fake News, the establishment of a disinformation ecosystem that fosters cognitive dissonance and erodes public debate with the proliferation of hate speech and the so-called cancellation culture, the cartographic path that we propose in this article sought to unveil meanings of the anti-democratic manifestations of January 8, 2023, in Brazil. It considered the performatic-discursive strategies triggered in a disinformation ecosystem that feeds hate affections and ultra-conservative moral values that subvert political play by deliberately spreading misinformation on a massive scale.

The look of communication for the coup acts of January 8 in Brazil allowed us to reflect on their performatic-discursive strategies and organize a map, envision a landscape, and identify escape routes in a moving territory in which online social networks are used as tools for political mobilization, the constitution of a parallel circuit of indoctrination and disinformation in which conspiracy theories circulate freely. As we argue above, the conditions that enabled the coup attacks in Brasilia are based on paranoid beliefs. These blatant conspiracy theories inflated the clash against a supposed left hegemony on a global scale. The war rhetoric of the "internal enemy" to be eliminated precludes any attempt at dialogue.

There is no dialogue possible when we face a shallow discourse, which dispenses systematic reflection and unleashes hatred by spreading in the volatile and rapid environment of the digital universe. This is the shaky ground from which the disinformation associated with dismantling institutions and the attack on freedom and democracy emerges. This is the diffuse landscape in this territory, built with falsified or impostor content and a context that presents itself as true and straight. We glimpse characters from a parallel world in which pastors, military, and politicians of the so-called "low" and "high clergy" promote a supposed "holy war," an insidious belief system of a fundamentalist nature, endowed with an (in)internal coherence paranoid and immune to the principles of reality. It is in this place that negationism meets the anti-democratic movement. According to Rancière (2014), the "hatred of democracy" becomes "democratic individualism." The subject varies his electoral choices as his intimate pleasures vary. The fundamentally egalitarian relations established in the techno-mediatized public space converge to a key of reading both individualistic and conservatively moral and governed by the market.

Finally, the line of escape in this territory presupposes the production-circulation-consumption of performative-discursive mobilization, oriented in real-time on a massive

scale. We no longer face ignorant or naive people but a perversion of rationality and a "break" between rulers and governed. Disqualification from the public sphere and social and institutional mediation leads to irrationality and superstition that conform to thoughts and modes of interpretation of the world. Therefore, disinformation, negationism, and anti-democratization become keys to understanding what happened in the country and seem to be the main factors against which resistance to improving the defense for citizenship in Brazil must be opposed.

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