Alternative constituent electoral strip: Against the communicative hegemony of social movements in post-rebellion Chile

Franja electoral constituyente alternativa: Contra hegemonía comunicativa de los movimientos sociales en Chile post rebelión

Faixa eleitoral constituinte alternativa: Contra a hegemonia comunicativa dos movimentos sociais no Chile pós-rebelião

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Abstract: The following article seeks to analyze the electoral bands derived from the first post-rebellion constitutional electoral process in Chile, seeking to focus on the counter-hegemonic communication strategies of social movements that were developed on multi-digital platforms, highlighting among them social networks such as Instagram. and Facebook. For the above, a brief contextualization of the electoral bands in Chile was carried out, framed in a media system of limited plurality, centralized and concentrated in large economic monopolies. Despite this, the irruption of lists and independent candidates from social movements, mainly from indigenous peoples, feminist movements, and sexually affective dissidents, also generated a communication irruption. This new modality was reflected when presenting programs, proposals, and candidacies since they were not limited exclusively to the official electoral strip but deployed various communication initiatives that even sought to expand and diversify what we know as electoral strips, developing a communication counter-hegemony. Methodologically, the article was developed based on search engine queries and monitoring of links in sites related to the candidacies and their respective networks. In addition to the search, the process contemplated a classification and an analysis of the different elements hosted on the Internet and related to the subject. Likewise, groups outside the process were included -but with an essential role in political diffusion- such as media observatories and social and political organizations that have carried out alternative propaganda activities more than campaign and political diffusion. Through the results, he realizes the various communication strategies used by social movements through the participation of alternative electoral bands that emerge from digital platforms, where he realizes the development of specific content - not necessarily hegemonic-depending on whether they belong to the women's and the feminist movement, to a movement of affective sexual dissidence or a multinational movement.

Keywords:

Electoral strip, constituent process, hegemony, social movements

Resumen: El siguiente artículo, busca analizar las franjas electorales derivadas del primer proceso electoral constitucional post rebelión en Chile, buscando poner el foco en las estrategias comunicativas contra hegemónicas de los movimientos sociales que fueron desarrollados en multi plataformas digitales, resaltando entre ellas las redes sociales como Instagram y Facebook.

Para lo anterior, se realizó una breve contextualización de las franjas electorales en Chile, enmarcadas en un sistema mediático de limitada pluralidad, centralizado y concentrado en grandes monopolios económicos. A pesar de ello, la irrupción de listas y candidatos independientes devenidos de movimientos sociales, principalmente de los pueblos originarios, movimientos feministas y disidencias sexo afectivas, generó también una irrupción comunicacional. Esta nueva modalidad se vio reflejada a la hora de presentar programas, propuestas y candidaturas, ya que no se limitaron exclusivamente a la franja electoral oficial, si no que desplegaron diversas iniciativas comunicacionales que incluso buscan ampliar y diversificar lo que conocemos como franjas electorales, desarrollando una contra hegemonía comunicacional. Metodológicamente, el artículo se desarrolló en base a consultas en motores de búsqueda, seguimiento de enlaces contenidos en sitios relacionados con las candidaturas y sus respectivas redes. El proceso contempló además de la búsqueda, una clasificación y un análisis de los distintos elementos alojados en Internet y relacionados con el tema. Así también, se incluyeron agrupaciones ajenas al proceso -pero con un rol de difusión política importante- tales, como observatorios de medios, organizaciones sociales y políticas que han realizado actividades de propaganda alternativa más que de campaña y difusión política. A través de los resultados, se da cuenta de las diversas estrategias comunicativas empleadas por los movimientos sociales a través de la participación de franjas electorales alternativas que emergen de plataformas digitales, donde se da cuenta de la elaboración de contenidos específicos – no necesariamente hegemónico-, según si pertenece al movimiento de mujeres y feminista, a movimiento de disidencias sexo afectivas o a movimiento plurinacional.

Palabras clave:

Franja electoral, proceso constituyente, hegemonía, movimientos sociales

Resumo: O seguinte artigo busca analisar as bandas eleitorais derivadas do primeiro processo eleitoral constitucional pós-rebelião no Chile, buscando focar nas estratégias de comunicação contra-hegemônicas dos movimentos sociais que foram desenvolvidas em plataformas multidigitais, destacando entre elas as redes sociais como como Instagram e Facebook. Para isso, foi realizada uma breve contextualização das bandas eleitorais no Chile, enquadradas em um sistema midiático de pluralidade limitada, centralizado e concentrado em grandes monopólios

econômicos. Apesar disso, a irrupção de listas e candidatos independentes de movimentos sociais, principalmente indígenas, movimentos feministas e dissidentes sexualmente afetivos, também gerou uma irrupção comunicacional. Essa nova modalidade se refletiu na apresentação de programas, propostas e candidaturas, já que não se limitaram exclusivamente à faixa eleitoral oficial, mas desenvolveram diversas iniciativas de comunicação que buscaram, inclusive, ampliar e diversificar o que conhecemos como faixas eleitorais, desenvolvendo um balcão de comunicação -hegemonia. Metodologicamente, o artigo foi desenvolvido a partir de consultas em buscadores, monitoramento de links contidos em sites relacionados às candidaturas e suas respectivas redes. O processo contemplou além da busca, uma classificação e uma análise dos diferentes elementos hospedados na Internet e relacionados ao assunto. Da mesma forma, foram incluídos grupos fora do processo -mas com um importante papel de difusão política- como observatórios de mídia, organizações sociais e políticas que realizaram atividades alternativas de propaganda mais do que campanha e difusão política. Através dos resultados, ele percebe as várias estratégias de comunicação utilizadas pelos movimentos sociais por meio da participação de bandas eleitorais alternativas que surgem das plataformas digitais, onde percebe o desenvolvimento de conteúdos específicos - não necessariamente hegemônicos -, dependendo se pertencem ao grupo de mulheres e movimento feminista, a um movimento de dissidência afetivo-sexual ou a um movimento multinacional.

Palavras-Chaves:

Faixa eleitoral, processo constituinte, hegemonia, movimentos sociais

1. Introduction and contextual background

The electoral strip is the only free and obligatory transmission for national television channels in Chile, in which political propaganda and advertising can be carried out through open television channels (Marshall Barberán, 2008). In practice, however, in some cases, the right to communicate ideas to the audience is not exercised due to the significant shortness of time allocated to some parties and independent candidates (Marshall Barberán, 2008). Even with tallow us, the electoral strip remains a strategic resource for many candidacies, especially independent ones, since, despite the logic of time distribution, the formats of the strip themselves allow it to capture a vast audience, as the videos are available on the web (Correa, 2021). This is

the reason for our approach to include particular emphasis on social networks, as it is independent of the resources directed to political dissemination to make part of the campaign to citizens, to gain followers and volunteers, it is necessary to use social networks (Briones, 2014), from where the candidates have the task of indicating and spreading their objectives behind their work of dissemination in those spaces.

Briones (2014) refers to three primary purposes when generating a solid image in social networks; build trust, create emotional value, and need to be transversal; with the aim of "humanizing politicians, approaching with a unified message on social networks with a viral potential" (Briones, 2014, p. 30). However, there is an inequality in the process since, while historically, political parties and their representatives spend millions on purchased media for advertisements, political propaganda, and own websites for their candidates (SERVEL, 2017, 2020), today the situation has become even more complicated for independents, far from the traditional political spectrum, not only for the lack of resources but mainly to the difficulty of deploying an electoral campaign under the restrictions of displacement and assembly imposed by the coronavirus pandemic, so in many cases, social networks are a primary means to use in this context (Weibel Barahona and Pérez Campbell, 2021).

Our objective is to recognize and relieve the emergence of an alternative constituent electoral strip in response to the gaps and inequalities in the electoral and communication system in the first constituent process, 2019-2022, post-rebellion in Chile.

1.1 Constituent process 2019-2022 within the framework of the Chilean electoral system

Through the implementation of Law 20.840, the binominal system in Chile was replaced by a proportional system, which meant a series of changes in electoral rules, such as the redistricting of territories to represent, a decrease in the number of districts, an increase in the number of elected parliamentarians and/or parliamentarians per district, between 3 and 8 seats for the lower house, between 2 and 5 seats for the upper house, and the implementation of the Gender Quotas Act, to ensure the participation of women in the lists (BCN, 2015). The mechanism used to allocate seats was maintained using the D'Hondt system. It also allowed the formation of national electoral pacts between two or more parties. Although this reform of the electoral system was expected to have a positive impact on representativeness, its effects showed

an over-representation of the big parties, superior to that of other proportional formulas (Gamboa and Morales, 2020) and a privileged position of those parties that formed electoral pacts, to the detriment of independent and emerging parties (San Martín, 2020).

The elections of candidates and candidates to conventional constituents in the 2019-2022 electoral period were based on the logic of deputy elections, where the list of accepted candidatures that appeared on the ballots grouped exactly 1,275 candidatures from the 28 districts along the 16 regions of the country of Chile, in addition, 17 indigenous representatives had reserved seats. Seventy-one pacts and 31 political parties brought candidates to the ballot, and only 155 were elected in the 28 districts that drafted the Constitution proposal by popular vote. The above indicates that the limitations presented by the proportion of seat mechanism were maintained. The candidates were able to stand on independent lists -with the support of at least 0.5% of the voters who voted in the district election-with an amount equal to or greater than 0,2% of voters who voted in the district in the elections of past deputies or participate in party lists, which can integrate independent candidates who decide to form the pact (BCN, 2020).

In this constitutional period, gender quotas were focused on the registration of lists and the allocation of seats, relieving gender parity throughout the constituent body process. Also included were 17 seats reserved for Indigenous Peoples, of which four correspond to the Aymara people, 7 to the Mapuche People, and 1 for each of the remaining villages: Diaguita, Atacameño, Quechua, Rapa Nui, Colla, Yagán, Chango and Kawéskar (BCN, 2021). It is essential to mention that the reserved seats had the option of choosing between two ballots (beige or green), of which one corresponded to the candidacies of the people to which they belong at the national level and one to the candidacies of their district, for example, a Mapuche voter could decide whether to vote on the national ballot or the ballot of his people with nominations for reserved indigenous seats. Finally, the pacts and lists had to present at least 5% of people with different abilities within their candidacies.

Considering what Saint Martin (2020) said, the D'Hondt system is a mechanism for allocating seats that considers the votes of the list over the candidate, in which the majorities overcome small forces and/or pacts. This posed an even more significant challenge for those separated from the current political parties to form independent lists and those who do not decide to be part of any. Therefore, it seems necessary for the new pacts to have a clear awareness of the

importance of the list over the candidates themselves and to form strong lists with transversal interests, which is difficult in the context of the high atomization of political and/or party forces.

1.2 Electoral Zones in Chile: Yesterday and Today

Electoral stripes are a contemporary phenomenon that combines communicational and political aspects precisely because it corresponds to political propaganda broadcast in media with general characteristics. In Chile, they are based on constitutional principles. These three are a) the principle of equal treatment, b) the principle of political pluralism, and c) the right to free expression (García Rodríguez, 2013).

The Chilean electoral strip is regulated by Law 18,700. It consists of allocating a space (20, 30, or 40 minutes per day) where electoral propaganda of various types of elections is broadcast on free television channels (President of the Republic, congressmen, national plebiscites). The first exercise of this type was radio and dates from 1962, but it was a paid space, while television was presented in 1988 ad-portas of the plebiscite with which the Chilean dictatorship ended (Marshall Barberán, 2008; García Rodríguez, 2013).

Some of the characteristics of the strip, established in the law, are: a) it is limited to TV only; (b) it is free of charge for both candidates and the State, and the content must be provided for each nomination; (c) it is compulsory for all television channels of free reception in the country, State and private; (d) is the only form of propaganda on television; (e) the strip lasts typically 27 days (f) the length of the strip is variable (20, 30 or 40 minutes) (Marshall Barberán, 2008).

In this sense, the strip is a space for official political diffusion, which response to constitutional principles and can impact voters. The investigations in this regard account for its significance in various dimensions. The first is that their themes and faces generate political and media agenda, which has a persuasive capacity to improve the image of the candidacies, according to Stephens et al. (2011), as well as helping to boost voting and participation. Although its impact and importance have diminished in Chile, it continues to be a transcendent space for dissemination (Uribe et al., 2018).

The constituent strip 2019-2022 began its television broadcasts on March 12, 2021, extending until April 8, 2021. However, due to the postponement of the elections due to the

COVID-19 pandemic, the electoral strip had to be suspended, so on May 12, 2022, the last two remaining transmissions were resumed.

Before these events, Law 21,200 established that the elections of conventional constituents would operate under the same dynamic as the elections to Congress, which included a space of 30 minutes per day corresponding to lists belonging to political parties (NCB, 2019). However, the large number of independent candidates and constituent candidates revealed a severe problem of equity in terms of visibility time in the official band, corresponding to only a few thousandths of seconds for all independent candidates, relegating almost 40% of applicants to this television space (Cooperativa.cl, 2021).

Considering this, it should be recalled that on March 3, 2021, a constitutional reform was approved granting additional time to independent candidates, corresponding to one second per candidate, if grouped into independent lists (The Counter, 2021). As a result, the time corresponding to the constituent strip was 38 minutes and 48 seconds per day, divided into two blocks, with a day (12:45 hours) and evening (20:45 hours). This total time corresponds to 1,373 candidates, where the Pacts and Political Parties had a total of 26 minutes and 6 seconds, the reserved seats of Indigenous Peoples, with 95 candidates and 3 minutes with 54 seconds, and finally, the independent candidates, with 528 candidates, with 8 minutes and 48 seconds (CNTV, 2021a), reflecting the inequality that the latter had to face this process, compared to candidates supported by political parties, and even independent supported by conglomerates (Carvajal, 2021).

1.3 The media system in Chile: Concentration and Pluralism

Understanding that the so-called "electoral strip" is developed on television platforms, it is inevitable to attend to the media variable, which has its particularity in Chile. The Chilean media system is paradigmatic in the world, even within the group of neoliberal systems, precisely because it contains characteristics that make it a complex case of concentration and limited pluralism (Mönckeberg, 2009; Mayorga et al., 2010; War, 2019). One of the examples of this unusual condition is that the public channel (TVN) does not receive state funding, something unheard of in a public medium, which is instead required to be self-financing, "in few countries of the world, it acquires such extreme forms, where diversity is conspicuous by its total absence in the written press and is strongly limited on TV" (Mönckeberg, 2009, p. 13).

In terms of content, it is indicated that in the Chilean system, there is an economic and ideological monopoly (Sunkel and Geoffroy, 2001). Gramsci (1972) had already proposed it when he developed the concept of "hegemony" as the cultural and moral direction that the ruling classes seek to exercise, where the press plays a transcendental role, as he points out:

> [...] This is why there is the struggle for the monopoly of the organs of public opinion: newspapers, parties, and Parliament, so that a single force shapes opinion and, therefore, the national political will, turning dissidents into individual and inorganic dust. (Gramsci, 1972, p. 339)

This affects the pluralism of ideas, cultures, and those sectors of society today seeking to be part of a more participatory and inclusive democracy. Added to this aspect is the condition of deep centralism maintained by Chile that is replicated in its media system, where the structural and content focus is stagnant in Santiago.

This is also reflected in a report by the Center for Journalistic Research (CIPER), which analyzed 121 debates of candidates and candidates for constituency broadcast by five television programs. The conclusions of the study aim to reinforce the above: The traditional media were lacking in pluralism in addressing this constituent process, and although there was significant progress in terms of gender parity concerning those invited to the programs, there is at least a significant gap between the candidatures of the Metropolitan region and the regional candidacies. The same situation is even more evident with the candidacies for reserved seats by indigenous peoples, who had little participation in the constituent debates, equivalent to only 1.5% of the invitations to these five programs. Finally, the study also points to an over-representation of the districts of the better-off communes of Santiago.

The Chilean open TV, where the strip is broadcast, contains five signals of broad coverage, four of the private type and only one published, according to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, grants a 2,340 that corresponds to a declared concentration scenario. A scenario of concentration condemns a country to a "closure" of more democratic development (Mastrini & Becerra, 2001), added to the limited pluralism, presents us with a complex panorama for the diffusion of diversity, dissent and non-hegemonic alternatives (Guerra, 2019; Mönckeberg, 2009).

Surveys carried out by the National Television Council show that, although open TV has lost audience in younger audiences, it remains the primary means of information (Fuentes,

2021); However, it reproduces the same consumption profiles of open TV that exists in non-electoral years. This would show that this space does not break the inertia of open TV consumption, receiving an influx primarily from the audiences of the programs immediately before their broadcast (Uribe et al., 2018).

According to CNTV sources, the audience of this strip has not undergone significant changes compared to previous bands. Although it is said that more women than men see the official electoral strip, this audience composition is usually also for general programming. It is not a particularity of the electoral strip. It is also noted that:

> The audience of the strip follows a pattern similar to the general screen. The higher strata watch less television. The lower ones watch more. Segment D covers just over 45% of the total audience of both bands. Segment C2 varies according to schedule, with a more significant presence in the day band. (CNTV 2021b, as cited in Olivares, 2021, paragraph 5)

1.4 Social networks as a propaganda space

In turn, as a communicational counterweight to traditional media, social networks in recent electoral processes have been vital for the development and visibility of independent candidates since, although the television channel has more excellent national circulation (CNTVa, 2021), it is in social networks where ways emerge to generate dialogue and dissemination around the respective political proposals, without the limitations that the official electoral strip imposes on these candidacies. These platforms offer citizens the opportunity to inform, debate and participate freely. The arrival of social networks allows citizens to have mechanisms for producing and disseminating their content and to participate in political conversation (Marcos-García et al., 2020). As far as the political and organizational field is concerned, the dynamic between the "new" and the "old" has created new spaces of commitment that have changed what has been established in terms of political participation (Chadwick et al., 2016).

That said, almost all the independent lists of the first constitutional process 2019-2022 had at least one active social network, from which two types of candidacies were generally evident; he/she who already has a political background and therefore a knowledge of the electoral behavior expected of a candidate (Opazo and Sánchez, 2017), and those individuals/as and lists associated with citizen voices and social organizations, that have emerged as instances

of participation, far from traditional political mechanisms. And it is precisely under this logic of participation that what is evidenced in social networks is, more than a typical political campaign, an information space, where candidates not only share their ideas and projects but also generate meetings, spaces for exchange, and relevant information regarding the constituent electoral process 2019-2022.

However, it should be noted that although television media is part of the hegemonic gear, not necessarily social networks are their contrast, but rather are windows that allow amplifying varied voices, plural all, but not necessarily all against hegemonic, since understanding this Gramscian category as a process that seeks to install a critical discourse to the dominant model and spread struggles and resistances that are put at the service of the subordinate classes, is that the counterhegemonic balance slides rather to the social movements than to the independent candidacies, which although they were quite aware of plurality, in some cases maintain discourses that legitimize or reinforce the hegemonic model.

2. Methodological notes

The elections for constituent seats not only represented an electoral milestone in the history of the State of Chile, both for the socio-political significance of the process and the unprecedented number of candidates involved in this electoral process, all this amid a global pandemic. And while the mainstream media continue to maintain a central role in the political and social sphere, the dilemmas of the distribution of time in the independent band gave way to an explosion of diversity in the candidacies, which, while achieving visibility, failed to position their speeches (Miranda Ríos, 2021). In this sense, it is not surprising that social networks have been transforming in a relevant way the field of political communication in this aspect (Marcos-García et al., 2020).

Thus, the corpus of this research allows us to know important aspects of the communicational characteristics of alternative and/or independent bands in their dissemination and political propaganda. This was done through search engine queries and tracking links in sites related to the nominations and their respective networks. The process included, in addition to the search, a classification and an analysis of the different elements hosted on the Internet and related to the subject. Also included were groups outside the process -but with an important political dissemination role- such as media observatories and social and political organizations

that have carried out alternative propaganda activities rather than campaign and political dissemination.

3. Results: The current alternative bands and the emergence of "the new social movements."

3.1 Counter hegemony

First, various civil organizations, such as feminist collectives, migrants, environmentalists, territorial organizations, trade unions, and indigenous peoples, have developed a diverse diffusion that differs from the traditional political band. In these communication platforms, the specific interests of each group were identified in an alternative electoral campaign format, with different audiovisual material -electoral strip format, infographics, seminars, and conversations alluding to the process focused on applications that represented the guidelines of these communities.

As can be seen in the table, the movement of women and dissidents has four electoral strips, each with two or more communication platforms.

Fringe	Platform	Social Movements
1) Movement for the Teaching Unit (MUD)	RRSS (YouTube, Web, Facebook, Instagram)	Movement for education (student teacher)
2) Articulated Feminists on the Move (FAEM)	RRSS (YouTube, Web, Facebook, Instagram)	Feminist women's movement
3) Plurinational Strip	Web	Chilean Social Movement (broad) and Indigenous Peoples
4) Alternative strip "Watch out for the constituent process."	Open TV and RRSS (YouTube)	Broad spectrum. It does not declare an ideological affiliation.

5) Independent Social Movements	RRSS (YouTube, Web, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram)	Chilean social movement (broad)
6) The Independent Strip	RRSS (YouTube, Web, Facebook, and Instagram)	Broad spectrum. It does not declare an ideological affiliation.
7) Dissidents in the network	RRSS (Web, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram) Graphic	Movement of dissident's emotional sex
8)The Constituents	RRSS (Web, Instagram) Graphic	Movement of dissident's emotional sex
9) Parity cl	RRSS (Web, Instagram, Facebook)	Feminist women's movement

Table 1. Characterization of alternative bands. Platforms and social movement. Source: Own production.

On the other hand, the bands *Ojo con el proceso constituyente*, *Movimientos Sociales Independientes*, and *Franja Independiente* correspond instead to a broad spectrum of thematic affiliation, where the category "independent" is placed at the center but do not specify whether the independence of the candidacy is to the eaves of political parties or not, which is even reflected in the diffuse ideological affiliation, so the way social movements participate in it cannot be accurately identified.

We also see that the electoral strip of the teaching movement, raised by the *Movimiento por la Unidad Docente* (MUD), is a unique communication initiative that seeks to debate education policies to be incorporated into the 2019-2022 constituent process.

And finally, in the plurinational band, the use of the platform is more limited to web pages. They are also the only band that takes care of what concerns the indigenous peoples in the constituent process.

Thus, the various demands that arise from these collectivities, which are collectively called social movements, were new in the electoral political scene since, unlike the previous decades, they did not seek representation in the traditional parties -except for some independent candidates that are sponsored by political parties-but to give an account of a real protagonism of their struggles and experiences, with their voices and their channels or communication networks. For the same reason, social networks such as Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter, like YouTube, are essential when breaking the media siege of hegemonic channels.

3.2 Women's and feminist movement

From the data of the corpus, various information and dissemination platforms emerged from the women's and feminist movements. Public access spaces that seek to position the profile of feminist women, orienting the debate towards a feminist constitution. The details are projected in the table in numbers 2 and 9.

Feministas Articuladas en Movimiento (FAEM) is one of these platforms, which has networks such as Instagram, Facebook, and YouTube channel; those who conducted an electoral strip in a traditional format addressing the majority of women who meet the requirements as mentioned above at the national level in the 28 districts, where female candidates could make a small campaign message known, their district and their list, and were contacted directly from FAEM. It is essential to highlight the quality content, adding professional preparation and management in technical and practical aspects, where for a certain period, they maintained the strip with advertising on social networks. Also, through this space, conversations were held with and between candidates at the national level, with live broadcasts through their platforms. In the strip, its conversations and social networks are observed intersectionality in the aspects highlighted: childhood, youth, diversity, environment, and territory.

Figure 1. Feminist Women´s Movement. Source: Instagram @ faem_national.

Parity Cl, represented in the table by paragraph 9, is a space that also had Facebook, Instagram, a website with a declaration of principles where they maintain that it is an open space for women to apply for a new constitution in a feminist key that integrates the rights of women, children, adolescents, and LGBTIQ+ communities, in addition to maintaining a socio-environmental, plurinational and intercultural focus. Their platforms include descriptions of the candidacies concerning their lists, parties, districts, axes, and political trajectories. It should be noted that not all nominations are integrated into the web platform and the candidates by district.

Fringe	Women's and feminist movement
Feminists on the Move (FAEM)	Feminist values and ideology, participation and dissemination of feminist women's candidacies.

Plurinational Strip	Feminist values and ideology, participation and dissemination of feminist women's candidacies.
Independent Social Movements	Valoric and ideological feminist affiliation of one of the candidates belonging to the list.
The Independent Strip	Participation and dissemination of applications by feminist women.
Dissidents in the network	Partition and dissemination of feminist women's candidacies.
Les Constituyentes	Feminist values and ideology, participation and dissemination of feminist women's candidacies
Cl parity	Feminist values and ideology, participation and dissemination of feminist women's candidacies

Table 2. Identification of alternative bands linked to the women's and feminist movement.
Source: Own production.

### 3.3 Movement of Dissidents' emotional sex

Through the analysis, it was evident how the affective sex dissidents also raised information and debate platforms around the constituent process 2019-2022, making visible the demands of the LGTBIQ+ collectives and the candidacies that call themselves dissidents.

"Network dissidents" is "a platform for political action and activism of sexual and gender dissidents." Its content regarding the constituent candidates was focused on presenting these and their positions on some of the demands of dissent as a collective. It used graphic resources on websites and social networks such as Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter.

"Les Constituyentes," for its part, is an observatory of LGTBIQ+ issues focused mainly on the constituent process 2019-2022, which has exposed dissident candidacies and the community's demands through graphic and audiovisual resources. Their content is not only framed in the presentation of the candidacies, but they issued a descriptive report of the candidates regarding the political/administrative division, electoral division, campaign

contributions, lists, organizations, and parties, in addition to a characterization of the candidates as a whole. Their contributions are shared through their networks (see Table 1).

Image 2. The constituents of the LGBTIQ+ observatory. Source: Instagram @lesconstituyentes.

The analysis also revealed the link between collectives, in which *Feministas Articuladas en Movimiento* (FAEM) has incorporated dissident candidates into its conversations and debates through broadcasts on social networks. At the same time, *Paridad* has added to its platforms (website and Instagram) graphic information on the candidacies and proposals of feminist women, among which are also dissident women. Parity also includes in its declaration of principles the need to integrate the rights of the LGTBIQ+ community in the new Constitution.

Fringe	Movement Dissidents sex emotional
Feminists on the Move (FAEM)	Valoric and ideological affiliation to the LGTBQIA+ community, participation and dissemination of candidacies of dissident candidates.

Dissidents in the network	Valoric and ideological affiliation to the LGTBQIA+ community, participation and dissemination of dissident candidates.
Les Constituyentes	Valoric and ideological affiliation to the LGTBQIA+ community, participation and dissemination of dissident candidates.
Cl parity	Valoric and ideological affiliation to the LGTBQIA+ community, participation and dissemination of candidacies of dissident candidates.

Table 3. Identification of alternative bands linked to the movement of affective sex dissidents.

Source: Own production.

3.4 Indigenous Peoples Movement

Regarding the presence of the indigenous people's movement, although they appear in five of the nine bands identified, only one has a protagonist space, although not exclusive (see Table 2). The latter is vital because indigenous seats and parity are distinctive aspects of this 2019-2022 constituent process.

It is observed that *Feministas Articuladas en Movimiento* (FAEM), *Franja alternativa, Ojo con el proceso constituyente,* and *Movimientos Sociales Independientes* appear on some occasions, candidacies -outside the seats- of Mapuche people, that being visible in the surnames and symbolism of the candidates.

Image 3. Original Peoples Movement. Source: FAEMen @<u>faem_national electoral strip</u> image.

Only in the case of the Plurinational Strip is there an evident cross-cultural allusion visible in the name and the participation of candidates for reserved seats. But it is worth distinguishing that it was a space shared with candidacies of the social movement with a strong focus on Mapuche's identity. Still, it is not exclusive to the indigenous.

Fringe	Indigenous peoples' movement
Feminists on the Move (FAEM)	Dissemination of Mapuche applications
Plurinational Strip	Valoric and ideological attachment to the plurinational and active partitioning of reserved seats
Alternative strip "Watch out for the constituent process."	Dissemination of Mapuche applications
Independent Social Movements	Dissemination of Mapuche applications
Les Constituyentes	Presence in questions

Table 4. Identification of alternative bands linked to the indigenous movement. Source: Own production.

4. Conclusions

From the results above, we can conclude the following:

    a. The counter-hegemony is not an attribute present in all the exclusionary candidatures of the traditional parties since, in the independent candidatures, it was not observed in programmatic terms content against hegemonic, unlike what happens in social movements that have trajectories of struggle and historical trajectories, where the speeches against hegemonic are evidenced in the political programs and proposals of the candidacies.

    b. Although a fairly regulated opening is granted in the official electoral strip, it has not advanced in pluralism (Mönckeberg, 2009, Guerra, 2019; Sources 2021) to give a platform to these social movements against hegemony, so it has been a necessity for these organizations to make use of alternative media and audiovisual platforms, which made visible the diverse proposals and demands of these social movements.

    c. Following the discussion of hegemony, the alternative band has counter-hegemonic tones in response to the gaps in the television and electoral system, proposing a diffusion where the expressions reduced by the hegemonic conventional are strengthened. This is connected parallel with the crisis of Chilean TV, where the strip registers a slow but progressive loss of its importance in citizenship (Uribe et al., 2018). In turn, the Chilean media system does not generate guarantees due to its condition of limited pluralism and media concentration (Mönckeberg, 2009; Mayorga et al., 2010; Guerra, 2019). This also relates proportionally to the distance social movements maintain from these spaces and their decision to configure other communication methods.

    d. The use of new media in social networks is another phenomenon visible in these expressions. Social networks are transformed into a space where the social movement conveys its expressions of counter-communication hegemony. Unlike the broad spectrum TV, these networks' characteristics allow for generating more friendly, autonomous, and close content (Chadwick et al., 2016; Briones, 2014; Marcos-García et al., 2020).

e. In the latter sense, the guidelines and objectives declared by the traditional bands' point to distrust, where the media share places of questioning with the electoral system, the product of the lack of visibility and representation of the political and social diversity reflected in the inequality that exists between the new political forces and the traditional and/or majority parties (Fernández and Siegel, 2016; San Martin, 2020). The principles of equality, pluralism, and free expression that sustain the strip seem not to convince -added to the decisions that reduced the time of groups such as Native Peoples-configure a scenario of de-legitimacy of the electoral system (García Rodríguez, 2013).

f. The feminist movement shows its validity and creative force with multimedia and multiplatform productions. It also manifests a force that partly comes from the parity status of the constituent electoral process 2019-2022, which gave it unprecedented relevance and added to the intersectional aspects that are part of the candidacies. Likewise, the movement of dissidence/sex-affective diversities stands out for the graphic quality of its proposal. In the case of indigenous peoples, despite their presence, there is still a gap in appearance and platforms, as well as greater invisibility of peoples different from the Mapuche.

g. Finally, it should be noted that the strip reflects the democratic inequalities in Chile, and the alternatives to it, are evidence of an active, creative, and purposeful citizenship through their social movements that should have organized their campaign, in many cases from self-management and collective work. For this, social networks are a space for expression in the face of hegemonic communication barriers.

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